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Abstract.  The main objective of this study is to investigate factors 
influencing the external audit fees in Malta.  This includes assessing 
whether client size, complexity and risk, also known as the ―traditional‖ 
determinants, are applicable in the case of Malta, as well as testing the 
issue of premium pricing amongst the Big 4 audit firms. Of particular 
interest is the determination of specific factors relevant to such a market. 
A GLM regression model is used to examine the effect of the independent 
factors on the amount of audit fees for a sample of audit engagements 
performed in the Maltese audit market.  The model is further 
complemented by a series of semi-structured interviews with audit 
partners from various audit firms of different sizes. Results indicate that 
the amount of external fees is significantly influenced by audit client size, 
complexity, risk, ownership control and corporate status. Additionally a 
fee premium has been found to accrue to the Big 4 audit firms.   
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Introduction 
   
Limited liability companies in Malta are statutorily required to secure the services of an 
auditor in order to obtain a professional opinion on their financial statements.  In line 
with this, the Companies Act, Cap. 386 of the Laws of Malta, states that the remuneration 
for such services shall be determined by the company in general meeting.  
 
Taffler and Ramalinggam (1982) argued that the manner in which audit fees are 
calculated differs from that of other professions where fees are directly or indirectly 
calculated on the monetary aspects of the business involved.  Niemi (2005) confirmed 
that the basis on which audit fees is calculated is the number of hours to be worked on the 
engagement multiplied by the rate per hour and not any financial aspect of the subject 
matter.  All of the above delineates the fact that audit fees and their determination might 
be seen as a black box by the stakeholders involved.  ISA 210 affirms that the auditor 
shall agree the terms of the audit engagement with management and, where appropriate, 
with those charged with corporate governance.  In fact, Low et al., (1990) stated that a 
common problem faced by auditors and clients alike is the determination of audit fees 
that are mutually acceptable to both parties.  Lurie (1976: 32) advised that “the 
relationship between auditor and client is such that the client should deal with the subject 
of the auditor‘s fee with full confidence that the amount will be reasonable in relation to 
the services that must be performed‖.  In view of this, HO and NG (1996) highlighted a 
thorough understanding of the fee-setting process as a must, if companies and the 
auditing profession are to determine an optimal audit fee.   
  
By virtue of its important implications for a wide spectrum of stakeholders, comprising 
legislators, professional bodies, companies and the public at large (Zhang and Myrteza, 
1996) the pricing of audit services has been an appealing topic for researchers.  As a 
matter of fact, numerous studies have been carried out in the USA, UK, Australia, 
Canada and Continental Europe to investigate factors believed to have an influence on 
audit fees.  
  
Furthermore, similar studies, albeit to a lesser extent, were carried out in small states such 
as Singapore, Bahrain, Jordan and Hong Kong. However, conspicuously there is a dearth 
of research in the determinants of audit pricing in a microstate, accepted by the United 
Nations as being a sovereign state with a population numbering one million or less. 
 
A microstate, like Malta, differs from a macro state on a number of aspects, such as 
competition and regulation (Adriamananjara and Schiff, 1998), which may eventually 
impact the level of audit fees charged.  Thus, a study that investigates determinants of 
audit fees, whilst also having common matters relevant to larger countries, is also 
expected to shed valuable insight from an environment such as Malta, a microstate within 
the European Union. 
 
The objective of this study is to develop a model of the determinants of audit fees in 
Malta and establish whether: 
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 the so-called ―traditional‖ and other determinants of audit fees prove to be relevant in 
the case of Malta; 
 the size of the audit firm has an influence on the amount of external audit fees and 
whether the preliminary notion of premium paid by Big 4 clients is applicable in 
Malta; 
 there are any significant factors specific to Malta‘s microstate environment. 
 
After briefly introducing the subject, the next section presents an evaluation of the 
relevant literature.  The third section describes the research methodology adopted in this 
study, ensued by the presentation and discussion of the findings.  This will finally be 
followed by a summary together with the concluding remarks. 
 
Literature Review 
Production of Audit Services 
 
Over the past twenty years, an important line of auditing research has sought to 
understand the market for audit services by studying audit fees.  The ball was set rolling 
by the seminal research carried out by Simunic in the early eighties.  The latter argued 
that in order to test the competitiveness of the audit industry ―it is necessary to develop a 
positive model of the process by which audit fees are determined‖ (Simunic, 1980: 161).   
 
However, the factors relating to variation in audit fees incorporated in the models 
previously developed raised an identification issue: were the authors observing the supply 
curve (the willingness of audit firms to supply individual audit services at different fee 
levels) or the demand curve (the demand by individual auditees for audit services at 
different fee levels)?  Pong and Whittington (1994: 1073) answered that ―it seems 
plausible to assume that the supply curve is fixed whereas the demand curve shifts 
between auditees.‖  This implies that the supply curve is determined by the cost function 
of audit firms and is a function of the amount of work done, irrespective of the identity of 
the auditee.  Demand, on the other hand, depends primarily upon the size of the auditee. 
 
The same authors contend that this notion applies at best where an audit is a statutory 
requirement and the minimum standard of the audit is laid down by statutory and 
professional bodies and ―thus demand is inelastic to the fee and mainly dependent upon 
the amount of work required, as determined by the size of the auditee‖ (op cit: 1074). 
 
Hay et al., (2006: 146) summed it up by looking at the audit process from a production 
perspective whereby certain drivers are associated with variations in the level of audit 
fees as these drivers cause an auditor to perform more or less work during the course of 
the audit. 
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Core Audit Fee Determinants 
 
Simunic (1980: 161) opined that ―an audit fee is the product of unit price and the quantity 
of audit services demanded by the management of the audited company.‖   
 
Chaney et al., (2000) categorised the factors that explain audit pricing into demand-side 
and supply-side factors. Observable client characteristics that have the potential to affect 
the relative importance of the demand-side factors include client size and client 
complexity; with Cobbin (2002) describing both variables as the most dominant across 
the literature. Observable factors falling under the supply-side parasol include audit risk 
and audit firm size. 
 
A number of variables have been used in the literature to explain variations in audit fees.   
 
Auditee Size. Al-Harshani (2008: 687) hypothesised that ―the external audit firm is 
expected to perform more audit work as the client size increases to ensure the 
performance of an adequate amount of compliance and substantive testing.  This increase 
in audit effort is naturally expected to be associated with the increase in the amount of 
audit fees‖.  However, Gerrard et al.,(1994) outlined the fact that the relationship between 
audit fees and client size is unlikely to be linear.  In fact, the audit fee literature is replete 
with evidence suggesting that external audit fees are likely to be a decreasing function of 
size (Simunic, 1984; Francis and Stokes, 1986; Palmrose, 1986; Simon and Francis, 
1988; Maher et al.,1992).  The main reasons cited are three-fold: 
 the likelihood of economies of scale in the auditor‘s costs of doing work (HO and NG, 
1996); 
 the existence of more sophisticated internal control procedures in larger companies 
which help to reduce audit work (Ahmed and Goyal, 2005); 
 the use of audit sampling, as the sample size needed to achieve a required level of 
control and precision increases at a decreasing rate (Low et al., 1990). 
 
Firth (1985) explained that various proxy measures of size have been taken, as the 
number of hours worked, which is likely to be a function of the size of the company, and 
the billing rate per hour are unobservable.  A number of studies used total assets as a 
proxy for auditee size:  Brinn et al., 1992; Joshi and Al-Bastaki, 2000; Gist, 1992; Taylor 
et al., 1999; Simon, 2005; Simon and Taylor, 2002; Carson et al., 2004.  The main 
argument put forth by Chan et al., (1993) is that if audit firms adopt an approach which is 
essentially balance sheet based, then total assets is the most suitable measure.  On the 
other hand Zhang and Myrteza (1996) Basioudis and Fifi (2004) and Ji-Hong (2007) 
considered turnover as a better explanatory variable as long as auditors employ a 
transaction-based audit approach to verify turnover and profits directly.  
 
Al-Harshani (2008: 687) hypothesised that ―the external audit firm is expected to perform 
more audit work as the client size increases to ensure the performance of an adequate 
amount of compliance and substantive  
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Auditee Complexity. Al-Harshani (2008) found that audit fees are significantly 
influenced by the level of audit client complexity.  In fact, he penned that a ―more 
complex audit means a more diverse organisational structure and harder to review 
transactions‖.  This increased audit effort is expected to lead to an increase in the level of 
audit fees. 
 
Chan et al., (1993) divided audit complexity into two, namely scope of operations and 
balance sheet composition.  Earlier on, Simunic (1980) had pre-defined the scope of 
operations as being made up of two main components: decentralisation, measured by the 
number of consolidated subsidiaries, and diversification, measured by the number of 
industries in which the auditee operates.  Chan et al., (1993) maintained that costs 
associated with the audit of separate financial statements, each of which has to comply 
with a variety of statutory and professional requirements for disclosure, will eventually 
be passed on to the client.  In fact HO and NG (1996) reported that the most popular 
surrogate used to measure the scope of operations is the number of principal subsidiaries 
of the auditee.  In contrast, Simon and Taylor (1997) focused more on the balance sheet 
composition as a determinant of complexity.  They opined that auditors have long 
recognised that the valuation assertion of inventories and receivables is in its nature very 
subjective and judgemental. 
 
As can be noted, the evidence in the literature is inconclusive as to whether it is 
complexity in terms of scope of operations or balance sheet composition which has the 
most significant impact on the level of audit fees.  Whilst most studies, including Waresul 
and Moizer (1996), Anderson and Zeghal (1994) and Ji-Hong (2007), concluded that both 
elements are significant, Firth (1985) found the scope of operations to be insignificant 
whilst Chan et al., (1993) concluded that the balance sheet composition ratios are 
insignificant. 
Auditee and Auditor’s Risk 
 
Simunic and Stein (1996) in putting forth their opinion state that, since auditing is a 
business where the auditor must assume the risk of an uncertain rate of return, audit fees 
should reflect that risk.  Bell et al., (2001) concluded that in a competitive equilibrium, 
audit fees should reflect the expected costs of auditor business risk. The main proxies 
used in previous studies to determine whether risk is significant when pricing an audit 
were as follows: 
 
Audit Qualification:  Dopuch et al., (1987) stated that a qualification increases auditor 
business risk as it may indicate the existence of financial or other uncertainty surrounding 
the auditee.  Moreover Palmrose (1986) concluded that qualified opinions require the 
accumulation of a greater amount of evidence than would otherwise be the case to 
achieve the auditor‘s desired level of assurance.  On the other hand, Jubb et al., (1996) 
reflected that a qualification may help to protect the auditor from a charge of negligence 
and so reduces the auditor‘s business risk. 
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Inventories and Receivables to Total Assets: Although this variable has received 
overlapping use in the literature as a complexity factor, Jubb et al., (1996) and Gonthier-
Besacier and Schatt (2007) argued that this factor may be taken as a surrogate for audit 
risk since the risk that inventories and receivables are materially misstated is higher than 
for other accounts.  
Gearing, Liquidity, Loss History and Profitability Ratio:  It is argued that these 
alternative measures are generally associated with the potential for, or actual level of, 
auditee financial distress.  Such distressed situations lead to more financial statement 
errors and window dressing in annual financial reports.  This will in turn lead to a greater 
likelihood of audit failure and hence involvement in audit-related litigation (Kreutzfeldt 
and Wallace, 1986). 
Audit Firm Size 
 
One of the most important research questions typically examined was whether audit fees 
are affected by audit firm size.  Mixed results were obtained, with some studies (Craswell 
et al., 1995; Gul, 1999; DeFond et al., 2000; Cameran, 2005; Chuntao, 2005; Lee, 1996; 
Naser and Nuseibah, 2007; Van Caneghem, 2010) reporting evidence of a fee premium 
paid to the ―Big 4‖, and other studies (Chung and Lindsay, 1988; Simon, 1995; 
Langendijk, 1997) failing to find evidence of such fee premium.  Simunic (1980) opined 
that such fee premium can accrue in both non-competitive and competitive markets.  In a 
non-competitive market a dominant subset of auditors (Big 4 firms), through collusion, 
may agree to limit price competition and hence introduce an element of monopoly profit 
into audit prices.   
 
Francis (1984) hypothesised that if competition prevails, one of the following three 
scenarios would hold: 
Scenario 1: No price differences between Big and non-Big 4 would indicate no price 
differentiation or scale economies. 
Scenario 2:  Lower Big 4 prices would indicate economies of scale to Big 4 auditors.   
Scenario 3:  Higher Big 4 prices would indicate product differentiation to Big 4 
auditors. 
 
Che Ahmad and Houghton (1996) summarised the alternative theories that have been 
proposed to explain the existence of product differentiation that leads to a Big 4 
premium: 
 
Economic rent theory: DeAngelo (1981) suggested that auditor size alone can explain the 
supply of a higher level of audit quality (defined as the joint probability of detecting and 
reporting material financial errors).  Her main theory hinged on the fact that large audit 
firms stand to lose more quasi-economic rents simply because they have more clients.  
Thus to avoid this loss in reputation, large firms have a greater incentive to supply higher 
quality audits. 
 
Brand name development theory:  Whereas the previous model viewed audit quality as a 
passive by-product, Francis and Wilson (1988) embraced a more active theory that audit 
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firms are explicitly motivated to develop and maintain brand name reputation for quality 
in order to secure and protect the quasi-rents.   
 
Demand-based model: This theory implies that an audit service possesses three 
characteristics valued by companies‘ top management, namely agency, information and 
insurance demand.  Differences in client circumstances lead to a demand for quality-
differentiated audits (Beattie and Fearnley, 1995). 
 
Industry specialisation. Further to the premiums earned from brand names, Rahmat and 
Iskandar (2004) identified that the premium derived might not be related exclusively to 
brand but also to industry specialisation on the part of the auditor.  McMeeking et al.,  
(2006) alluded that ―audit firms will invest resources in the creation of an industry 
specialist reputation if there are sufficient clients willing to pay higher fees that will cover 
this additional investment.‖  
Other Contributing Determinants 
 
Over the past 30 years, several authors sporadically used variables other than the above-
mentioned ones:  
 
Ownership control. Jensen (1986) concluded that a manager that has a large share of his 
wealth in the company is likely to be more risk-averse in making investment decisions 
than a manager who has a more diversified portfolio.  Furthermore, Abdel-Khalik (1993) 
argued that the higher the managerial ownership the lower the demand for assurance 
because owners are more actively engaged in day-to-day operations. In line with these 
arguments, Chow (1982) and Niemi (2005) found that audit fees are lower for companies 
which are owner-managed.   
Lennox (2005) further split agency costs into two.  There is a divergence-of-interests 
effect such that managers with small shareholding have weaker incentives to act in the 
interests of outside shareholders.  There also exists an entrenchment effect such that 
managers have more scope for behaving opportunistically when they have greater 
control. 
 
Corporate status. Langendijk (1997) established that a company which has a public 
listing may entail a greater risk for the audit firm.  Likewise, Gwilliam (1991) maintained 
that audit risk considerations have less importance in the auditing pricing decisions of the 
auditors as an audit failure of a small non-listed company is less likely to lead to 
negligence claims from shareholders. 
 
Auditee profitability. A low return on shareholders‘ equity indicates that the auditee 
might be facing financial pressure and thus is likely to seek to control overhead costs, 
possibly resulting in lower fees (Chan et al., 1993).  However this might be counter-
argued by the need to extend the scope of the audit work to focus more on the client‘s 
status as a going concern.   
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Busy season. The ‗busy season‘ variable was found to be significant by Francis and 
Stokes (1986), Craswell et al., (1995), Ezzamel et al., (1996) and Che Ahmad and 
Houghton (1996).  This refers to the months after the end of the financial year of most of 
the companies, when the workload of audit firms is at its peak.  
Audit report lag. Another variable used to assess variations in audit fees was the lag 
between the end of the accounting year and the audit report date (Ezzamel et al., 1996).  
A short time lag could be associated with either expensive audit fees or with efficient 
corporate accounting practices and internal control systems that could result in less audit 
work and hence lower fees. 
 
Methodology 
Research Design 
 
Drawing from the extensive literature and the preliminary interviews carried out with 
audit partners, the following model was posited: 
 
AF = β0 +  β1 Auditee Size + β2 Auditee Complexity +  β3 Risk +  β4 Auditor Size +  β5 
Other Factors + α 
Where: 
AF  = Audit Fee 
β0  = Intercept value (constant term) 
β1, β2… βn = GLM regression coefficients of  
                             explanatory variables 
α  = Residual error 
 
In view of the fact that the number of hours and the charge-out rate were considered to be 
non-observable due to the sensitivity of such information, surrogates for the independent 
factors were taken.  A number of variables were considered for each and every factor so 
as to minimize the possibility of omitting potentially significant explanatory 
determinants. 
 
 A number of alternative models, using various combinations of explanatory variables, 
were estimated by running a General Linear Model (―GLM‖) regression analysis on such 
factors.  Nevertheless, some of the independent variables did not yield statistically 
significant regression coefficients and as expected there was a high degree of correlation 
within each vector of variables.  In view of this, the variables with the least consistent 
explanatory power within each vector of variables were omitted.  
 
Owing to the nature of this study‘s objectives, a mixed approach, namely triangulation, 
was adopted whereby quantitative (regression model) and qualitative (semi-structured 
interviews) research are combined into a single study. In this way the statistical model, 
was complemented by semi-structured interviews, with particular emphasis devoted to 
unique characteristics that are specific to this microstate.  
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Data Collection 
 
Official lists for the companies subdivided by corporate status as at 31 December 2008 
were obtained. The categorised population of public limited companies is shown in Table 
1.  
 
Table 1  
 Population of Public Limited Companies 
  Population  
Financial 
Services 
No Accounts 
Filed 
Sampling 
Frame 
Public Listed Equity 25 6 0 19 
Public Listed Debt 17 0 0 17 
Public Non-Listed 63 6 30 27 
 
 
The entire population was incorporated in this research, with the exception of six public 
listed equity companies and six public non-listed equity companies operating in the 
financial services sector, due to the industry‘s unique nature and structure.  The other 30 
public non-listed companies not factored in this study had not yet filed their financial 
statements up to the point in time when data was collected, mostly because they had been 
incorporated during 2008. 
 
Data relating to the private companies (Table 2) was subdivided as per EU definition 
(European Commission, 2005) to ensure that any sample chosen is not biased towards a 
particular category.  All the large companies were factored in the study, while a random 
sample of the medium stratum was chosen.  Small and micro firms were eliminated from 
the sample, as they are entitled to file abridged accounts as per the Maltese Companies 
Act.  Likewise, some of the companies within the medium stratum also satisfied the 
―small companies‖ definition of the Companies Act. 
 
Table 2  
 Population of Private Companies 
 Large Medium Small Micro 
Private 41 238 1,159 28,285 
 
 
For each company chosen, financial information was obtained from the annual report 
submitted for each of the three years between 2006 and 2008.  When the model was run 
with the financial year as one of the independent factors, view of this, a pooled cross—
sectional sample was taken, with each year it was concluded that it was not significant at 
the 95% confidence level.  In as a separate reading for the purpose of the model. Hence, 
the total sample taken for the study over the three years, where applicable, was 372 units, 
as depicted in Table 3. 
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Table 3  
 Sample Selected  
  
Public  
Equity Listed 
Public Debt 
Listing 
Public 
Non-Listed 
Private 
Total 
Sample 
34 45 60 233 
 
Furthermore, semi-structured interviews were carried with ten audit partners, namely a 
partner from each of the Big 4 firms, and three each from the medium and small audit 
firms.  The relative size of the audit firms was based on the number of audit partners. 
 
Univariate GLM Assumptions 
 
A number of conventional tests were carried out to examine the extent to which the 
assumptions underlying GLM regression analysis were violated, as reported in 
Baldacchino et al., (2013), including tests relating to multicollinearity, whereby the 
explanatory variables were not found to be multicollinear. Baldacchino et al., also 
conducted tests for heteroscedasticity and found that the assumptions of homoscedasticity 
could not be rejected. 
 
Findings and Analysis 
 
The following list shows the meaning of the variables used in the model proposed in 
Baldacchino et al., (2014) with Audit Fee (LNAUDITFEE) as the dependent variable and 
the other variables as explanatory variables.  
 LNAUDITFEE: The natural logarithm of the amount disclosed in the notes to the 
accounts relating to auditor‘s remuneration. 
 LNTA: Natural logarithm of Total Assets as shown on the face of the Balance Sheet. 
 SQRTSUBS: Square root of the number of subsidiaries as described in the note 
‗Investment in Subsidiaries‘.  Any subsidiaries not consolidated are not taken into 
consideration. 
 SQRTFRGNSUBS: Square root of the percentage of foreign to total subsidiaries.  
Foreign subsidiaries were determined according to the registered address of each 
subsidiary. 
 (INVREC)/TA: Ratio of Inventory (gross of impairment) and Total Receivables (gross 
of impairment) to Total Assets. 
 QUICK: Ratio of Current Assets less Inventory to Current Liabilities. 
 FCF: Cash Flows from Operations less acquisitions of Non-Current Tangible Assets 
less acquisitions of Non-Current Intangible Assets plus Proceeds from Disposal of 
Non-Current Tangible Assets and Non-Current Intangible Assets. 
 ROCE: Ratio of Profit after Tax to Total Equity. 
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 REPORTLAG: Number of days between financial year-end and audit report date. 
 OWNCONT: Ultimate % shareholding by the directors as per MFSA searches. 
 GOVTOWNED: ‗1‘ if Government Owned (50% + 1 or more) and ‗0‘ if not 
Government Owned. 
 MTLFGNOWNED: ‗1‘ if beneficial shareholders are Maltese and ‗0‘ if companies are 
foreign-owned.  
 COMPSTAT: Public Listed (Debt or Equity), Public Not Listed or Private Company. 
 AUDSTAT: Big 4, Mid Tier and Small.  The latter two are classified according to the 
number of partners in the audit firm. 
 
The results of the model are summarised in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 
 Regression of Audit Fees on Explanatory Variables 
Explanatory Terms  Coefficient Std. Error t Stat. 
Intercept 
Intercept 
3.766 0.364 10.357 
LNTA 0.254 0.019 13.216 
SQRTSUBS 0.38 0.032 11.91 
SQRTFRGNSUBS 0.085 0.019 4.567 
INVREC/TA 0.006 0.001 4.239 
QUICK -0.01 0.001 -6.521 
FCF 7.92  3.23 2.451 
ROCE 2.78 1.21 2.31 
REPORTLAG -0.001 0.000 -3.159 
OWNCONT -0.003 0.001 -3.752 
GOVTOWNED -0.304 0.114 -2.663 
MTLFGNOWNED -0.292 0.07 -4.161 
COMPSTATPRIVATE  0.654 0.103 6.325 
COMPSTATPUBLICNOTLISTED 0.683 0.123 5.541 
COMPSTATPUBLICLISTEDEQUITY 0.986 0.133 7.386 
AUDSTATBIG 4 0.726 0.13 5.599 
AUDSTATMID TIER 0.487 0.151 3.225 
R2 = 0.82;  Adj. R2 = 0.81 
 
It can be seen from Table 4 that the explanatory variables of audit fees were found to be 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, and possess the right sign. 
 
In line with the various cross-sectional studies, the so-called ‗traditional‘ determinants, 
namely size, complexity and risk, were confirmed to be significant within the Maltese 
scenario.   
 
The results also highlight the existence of a Big 4 premium in the Maltese audit services 
market.  Moreover two factors specific to this microstate were identified with foreign 
companies tending to pay higher fees whilst the opposite may be said for entities where 
government is the major shareholder.    
 
Auditee size. The relationship between audit fees and auditee size was best explained 
when natural logarithm transformations were applied.  The level of total assets, used as a 
proxy measure for the size of the auditee, was found to be strongly and positively 
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correlated with the auditor‘s remuneration.  As the size of the business increases, there is 
an upward shift in the audit fee charged owing to the additional effort expended during 
the audit fieldwork.  Interviewees held that a client‘s asset base is a better measure of size 
when compared to the revenue earned, as most income statement items are audited as part 
of the cycle used to audit balance sheet items.  
 
Auditee complexity. The model affirms that complexity, in terms of the scope of 
operations has an effect on the audit fee, especially when the company‘s activities widen, 
particularly if they span across international borders.  In view of the non-linear 
relationship, square root transformation was applied.  From the interviews conducted, it 
has been corroborated that as active subsidiaries increase, consolidated financial 
statements require additional effort to audit as subsidiaries become more complex to 
audit.  Furthermore, related party transactions might be assessed as a significant risk 
especially where there is doubt as to whether such transactions were carried out at arm‘s 
length.  
  
Audit fees escalate further when the majority of subsidiaries are incorporated in foreign 
countries, as audit partners held that this requires additional correspondence with the 
foreign subsidiary‘s auditors, since ―group auditors are responsible for the opinion issued 
for the international group as a whole‖.  This may be attributable to the following factors: 
 the foreign subsidiary being registered as an offshore company in a tax haven 
jurisdiction, which automatically increases the complexity and the risk involved; 
 the primary team having to review the audit file of the foreign subsidiaries which are 
audited by non-member network firms; 
 the effort in preparing the Group Audit Instructions and the increased correspondence 
with the secondary auditors; 
 each jurisdiction having its own tax regime, thereby increasing the complexity in 
understanding tax-related matters. 
 
The balance sheet composition also plays a role in the determination of audit fees.  
Inventories and Trade Receivables, which are two of the major components of the 
balance sheet, were found to be statistically and positively significant in relation to the 
amount of audit fees paid.  Their significance may be explained by the fact that both have 
an element of uncertainty and judgement attached to them, especially when testing such 
account balances for impairment.   
 
Revaluation and impairment of assets and derivative financial instruments are complex 
areas to audit due to the subjectivity and judgement in relation to the valuation assertion.   
Yet, none of the variables was found to significantly influence the audit fee charged.   
 
Business and audit risk. The client‘s quick ratio, taken as a measure of business risk, 
registered an inverse relationship with audit fees.  This implies that external auditors tend 
to raise the bar when liquidity problems such as overtrading, start to hit home as they 
view such client as being riskier.   
 
The model recorded a positive coefficient for free cash flows (―FCF‖) indicating that if a 
firm has large cash reserves, managers have more choice and opportunity to 
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misappropriate cash, thereby implying higher inherent risk.  Such relationship mirror-
images the discussion put forth by Gul and Tsui (2001) who argued that managers of 
firms with high FCF are more likely to act opportunistically and be involved in ―value-
destroying activities”. 
 
The gearing ratio, which demonstrates the degree to which a firm‘s activities are funded 
by equity versus borrowed funds, a history of losses incurred by the auditee, and lagged 
and current audit qualifications were found not to be significantly correlated to the audit 
fee.  One plausible explanation may be that audit firms view business as well as audit 
risk, emanating from the auditee market, as very low.  This is reflected in the practically 
non-existent litigation cases in Malta against auditors, in contrast to the huge settlement 
fees forked out in other countries.   
 
Auditee profitability. A client earning a higher return on capital is likely to be charged a 
higher audit fee.  Some audit partners felt that if the client is enduring difficult financial 
times, they would be more ‗sympathetic‘ when negotiating the fee, provided their 
recovery rate is reasonable.  However, other partners disagreed with this notion, with one 
stating that ―auditing is a business, and one cannot go about pitying one‘s clients‖.   
 
Such findings indicate that lack of profitability is not viewed by the auditor as implicating 
higher risk arising from fraudulent financial reporting.  On the other hand, the positive 
relationship between ROCE and audit fees suggests that better-off clients might be 
viewed to have ―deeper pockets‖ and so are charged higher audit fees.   
 
Audit report lag. Short time frames between the financial year-end and the audit report 
date might be indicative of tight reporting deadlines whereas longer time lags are 
reflective of audit problems.  Whilst in the former scenario, it is expected that the auditee 
has to foot the bill, a number of partners stated that they find it very difficult to bill for 
the extra time and effort expended due to client‘s inefficiencies and issues.  
  
Ownership control. Owner-managed companies tend to view audits simply as an 
unnecessary cost and hence try to shift the price downwards.  Interviewees uphold such 
belief, adding that the audit is viewed by such companies simply as a statutory 
requirement with ―no added value‖.  This confirms the conclusion of Tabone and 
Baldacchino (2003) that Maltese owner-managed companies view the statutory audit as 
too historic, adding nothing new to what they already know. Linked with this factor, two 
determinants, exclusive to this micro-environment, were identified.  
 
One possible reason for such an outcome is that foreign-owned companies tend to regard 
the auditing service more highly than their Maltese equivalents who view an audit as 
something compulsory. On the other hand, the higher rates could be due to the deemed 
―deeper pockets‖ of foreigners, tying up with the explanations emanating from the results 
on auditee profitability.   The latter argument may hold stronger water in view of the fact 
that such clients, more often than not, are better organised, thereby contributing to a 
higher recovery rate. 
 
 14 
Company status. The model revealed that the company‘s status has a significant impact 
on the level of audit fees charged.  As can be concluded from Table 5, there are 
significant differences in the estimated marginal means between the different levels of 
company status, except for the pricing levels between private and public non-listed firms.  
 
It is evident that public listed equity companies command the highest fees in Malta.  This 
is comparable to the findings of Clatworthy and Peel (2007) who found that UK public 
limited companies were charged significantly higher audit fees than private equivalents.  
 
Table 5 
 Pairwise Comparisons—Company Status 
 
(I) 
COMPSTAT 
(J)  
COMPSTAT 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
Private 
Public Not Listed -0.030 0.088 0.735 
Public Listed (Equity) -0.332* 0.11 0.003 
Public Listed (Debt) 0.654* 0.103 0.000 
Public Not 
Listed 
Private 0.030 0.088 0.735 
Public Listed (Equity) -0.302* 0.123 0.014 
Public Listed (Debt) 0.683* 0.123 0.000 
Public Listed 
(Equity) 
Private 0.332* 0.110 0.003 
Public Not Listed 0.302* 0.123 0.014 
Public Listed (Debt) 0.986* 0.133 0.000 
Public Listed 
(Debt) 
Private -0.654* 0.103 0.000 
Public Not Listed -0.683* 0.123 0.000 
Public Listed (Equity) -0.986* 0.133 0.000 
* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
All audit partners admitted that issuing a wrong opinion for a public listed equity 
company would probably be suicidal for the audit firm, especially in a microstate 
environment.  As stated by an audit partner ―it is a different matter altogether issuing a 
wrong opinion for ABC plc as opposed to issuing the same for ABC Limited‖.  Yet, 
another reason why listed equity firms command higher prices is due to the extra work 
and effort involved in issuing an independent auditor‘s report on the Statement of 
Compliance with the Code of Principles of Good Corporate Governance in line with the 
Malta Listing Rules, in carrying a thorough review of a customarily voluminous annual 
report, and in having to attend audit committee meetings held during the year. 
 
On the other hand, it is notable that companies with debt securities listed on the Malta 
Stock Exchange ranked lowest. In this respect, Nikkinen and Sahlström (2004) opined 
that debt can have a negative impact on audit fees since the burden of having to make 
regular debt payments serves as a tool to discipline managers, which in turn tightens their 
hands in the negotiation of audit fees. 
 
Auditors Premium in the Maltese Audit Market. An analysis of the audit market shows 
that the Big 4 firms have the largest market share, indicating a supplier concentration by 
the Big 4 in the Maltese market. Big 4 firms command the highest fees, followed by the 
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mid-tier and small audit firms respectively.  Furthermore, a significant difference of the 
estimated marginal means on audit fees has been noted across all levels of audit firm size 
as shown in Table 6, which affirms that the pricing of the Big 4 includes a premium over 
and above that charged by the other firms. 
 
Since audit firms attempt to differentiate themselves, it may be that, quite apart from 
product differences, auditors differ in their pricing strategies.  Thus, in order to test 
whether the premium earned is attributable to any individual firm, the GLM regression 
model was re-run with each of the Big 4 firms being treated as a separate contender.  
Results strongly support the notion that audit fee premium prevails across the Big 4 
firms.  However, the audit fee charged by one of the Big 4 is not significantly different 
from that charged by the non-Big 4 firms. 
 
Table 6  
 Pairwise Comparisons — Audit Firm Size 
(I)  
BIG4_ 
MIDTIER_ 
SMALL 
(J)  
BIG4_ 
MIDTIER_ 
SMALL 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
Big 4 Mid Tier 0.240* 0.091 0.008 
Small 0.726* 0.130 0.000 
Mid Tier 
Big 4 -0.240* 0.091 0.008 
Small 0.487* 0.151 0.001 
Small 
Big 4 -0.726* 0.130 0.000 
Mid Tier -0.487* 0.151 0.001 
 
 
In order to test whether price competition prevails throughout the audit services market, 
the original GLM regression model was re-run for the large and small auditee sub-
samples as determined by the median total assets.  The statistically significant 
coefficients implied that the Maltese audit market is a competitive market and price 
competition along with product differentiation to the Big 4 prevails across the whole 
spectrum. 
 
In an attempt to separate the Big 4 premium into general brand-name reputation and 
industry specialisations, the model was estimated for the sub-sample of 101 auditees 
representing the two major industries in Malta, namely manufacturing and hospitality.  
One additional factor was used, with a value of one if the auditor is a Big 4 industry 
specialist and zero otherwise.  The classification was based on the data collected for such 
sample, involving the total audit fees earned by each and every audit firm subdivided by 
industry, the total assets audited by each firm in the industry, and the number of clients 
audited by every firm in that industry.   However, this variable was not found to be 
statistically significant. 
 
The Big 4 premium may be attributable to the higher cost structure, since such audit firms 
employ full-time partners and managers within the system who are responsible for 
technical matters and risk management, thereby incurring higher staff and operational 
costs.  Moreover, ongoing training has to be constantly given to staff so that they keep 
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abreast of changes in the accountancy and auditing profession and to ensure high 
calibration in line with the network‘s methodology, which albeit based on International 
Standards on Auditing, is more rigorous.   
 
All this ties in with the fact that all equity listed firms, except one, are audited by the Big 
4. Therefore listed firms probably view the Big 4 as higher quality auditors with more 
expertise than the non-Big 4 firms and their appointment is likely to be an implied signal 
of the good corporate governance by management with respect to shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  
Other Possible Determinants 
Other ―invisible determinants which theoretically have an impact on audit fees‖ (Low et 
al., 1990:293) include the following. 
 
Internal audits and the effectiveness of internal controls. Internal audits are said to 
strengthen internal controls and accountability within organisations.  The strength and 
extent of internal audit could be said to be directly correlated with the substantiveness of 
the external audit function.  For instance, work carried out by the internal audit 
department may be used as evidence by the external auditors, thereby reducing the 
duplication and the extent of audit work.  Although it is possible to determine which 
companies have such function, it is very difficult to determine its effectiveness, which is 
crucial if the aforementioned theory is to apply. Linked to internal audits is the notion of 
internal controls, which are also expected to affect audit fees because the audit process 
should be sensitive to differences in the control environment of an organisation.  Audit 
partners highlighted that an audit engagement, ceteris paribus, based on compliance 
testing is cheaper than if a fully substantive approach is adopted.  Owing to the sensitivity 
of the type of strategy executed by audit firms, such information was unavailable. 
 
Planning and setting the audit strategy. An auditor carrying out an audit in accordance 
with International Standards on Auditing is required to allocate sufficient time for the 
planning and strategy of the audit.  Both stages set the tone for the audit fieldwork and 
are essential in identifying risk areas. Time spent on these two stages is impossible to 
quantify or proxy for, thereby rendering them unobservable.  Notwithstanding, audit 
firms still take such time into consideration when setting the audit fee. 
 
Non-audit services. Whilst Abdel-Khalik (1990:318) opined that ―it is difficult to think of 
economic incentives that could exist a priori for clients to pay more for the joint 
acquisition of two products than for the sum of acquiring them separately‖, Simunic 
(1984), Palmrose (1986) and Firth (1997) found a positive association between non-audit 
fees and audit fees owing to a ‗knowledge spillover‘ leading to economic rents.   
 
The provision of non-audit services may also play a part in determining audit fees.  
However, given that information on non-audit fees was not publicly available, the 
quantifiable effect could not be determined. 
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Conclusion 
Summary of Findings 
 
This study highlighted the determinants of audit fees in Malta.  It also investigated 
whether the fee mechanisms in a microstate conform to other audit fee models as 
identified in larger jurisdictions, the applicability of the premium charged by the Big 4 
and whether any factors specific to the microstate market are prevalent.   
 
Most of the determinants such as size, complexity, risk, ownership control, corporate 
status and delay, were found to be significant in line with prior research.  This implies 
that a similar platform on which to calculate fees relates to Malta as in other countries.  
Probably this was to be expected, especially when one considers that the Big 4 firms 
command a large share of the Maltese audit market. 
 
Notwithstanding this, the Maltese audit market has specific factors brought to light by 
this study.  Certain risk factors found to be significant in similar studies were not viewed 
as a necessary ingredient in Malta  Furthermore, two specific and differentiating factors 
need to be studied further across other microstates, namely whether a company is foreign 
or Maltese owned and whether it is government-owned or otherwise.   
 
Recommendations 
 
Inclusion of risk factors when determining the fee:  It is evident that certain risk factors 
such as ‗history of losses‘, ‗gearing‘ and ‗current and lagged audit qualification‘ are not 
set high on the agenda when negotiating the audit fee.   This is becoming more important 
with the number of international foreign firms finding base in Malta on the increase, 
litigation against the auditor may gather pace, thereby resulting in severe losses for audit 
firms. 
 
Educating the client:  As discussed above, fees charged by Maltese audit firms were 
found to be lower than those charged in similar circumstances in other countries.  Hence 
it may prove useful if auditors embark on an exercise to educate the auditees about the 
nature of an audit whilst trying to shift the audit to a more value-adding and enriching 
experience vis-à-vis the auditee. 
Concluding remarks 
 
Considering today‘s dynamic environment and the global financial crisis, more 
challenges are in store for both the auditor and the auditee, especially in the fee-setting 
process.  The auditee is likely to face more significant risks in the aftermath of the credit 
crisis.  Whilst this is likely to involve additional effort on the part of the auditor, the 
auditee will try to keep the audit price at a minimum.  However, when both parties 
understand the factors behind the audit fee charged things are bound to become clearer. 
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